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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
MICHAEL PAUL ADAMS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
15353 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Michael Paul Adams, was charged with 
murder in the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of the lesser and 
included offense of manslaughter and sentenced to a term of 
not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered below. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 21, 1976, the appellant, Michael Paul 
Adams, entered the Crest Club in Murray, Utah, with Sharon 
Blood (T.65). The Crest Club is a private club with a 
bar where liquor is served to members. At the time the 
appellant and Sharon Blood arrived, other club members 
were present in the bar area, including Charles Goodman 
and Gerald Braithwaite (T.63-64). The appellant and Blood 
were acquainted with Goodman, and they sat near him at the 
bar and had a conversation with him. Initially, appellant 
and Goodman discussed phone calls that appellant's wife 
had allegedly made to Goodman's wife. Goodman testified 
that the conversation went no further (T.76, 85-87), but 
several other witnesses testified that Goodman claimed, 
in vulgar language, to have had sexual intercourse with 
appellant's wife (T.192,223,228,271-275,318). Appellant 
then left Goodman, but when he returned he pointed a loaded 
revolver at Goodman's head and stated, "I am going to kill 
you, you son-of-a-bitch." (T.70,116,152-153,175,192,240, 
276,323,335). The threat was repeated several times. After 
Goodman was unable to persuade the appellant to put the gun 
down, he turned his back to the appellant and faced the bar 
(T.71). Appellant then struck Goodman behind his right ear 
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with the gun (T.71,118,175,241,337-338). Goodman was dazed 
by the blow, and appellant again pointed his gun at Goodman 
and said, "Now you're a dead son-of-a-bitch." (T.71,118). 
Three events then occurred in rapid succession: Gerry 
Braithwaite came between the appellant and Goodman in an 
attempt to halt the fight (T.154,176,224-225), the appellant's 
gun went off and inflicted a fatal wound on Braithwaite (T.55-
56, 71-72,120,154,176,258), and Ken Bates, an 
off-duty, unarmed Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff threw a 
heavy, sharp-edged, glass ashtray at the appellant (T.118-119, 
177,243-244). The ashtray struck the appellant on the right 
side of his face and caused severe damage to his right eye 
(T.201-203,339). After the first shot had been fired, 
Goodman fled from the club, and the appellant fired two more 
shots in Goodman's direction (T.50,71-72,122-123,157,178,194). 
Appellant testified in his own behalf, and admitted 
pointing the loaded weapon at Goodman and bhreatening to kill 
him (T.323,335). Appellant claimed, however, that he did not 
intend to shoot Goodman and that he was afraid Goodman had 
a gun and would try to harm appellant's wife, Carol, who was 
coming to the club (T.324). Appellant testified that he 
did not intentionally pull the trigger of the murder weapon 
and that he had no memory of firing the gun (T.339-341). 
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During the State's case in chief, Lieutenant 
Oscar Hendrickson of the Salt Lake City Police, a firearm's 
expert, testified that the trigger on the murder weapon was 
harder to pull than on an average double-action revolver 
(T.165-166). In response to a hypothetical question, the 
witness gave his opinion that it was not reasonable to 
believe that the trigger could have been unintentionally 
pulled through reflex (T.170). Additionally, two of the 
State's witnesses testified that the first shot was fired 
before the ashtry struck the appellant (T.177,243-244). 
The State sought to introduce rebuttal evidence 
of a statement made by the appellant to the officer who 
arrested him, Joel Riet (T.372). Appellant objected to the 
proposed evidence because there was an insufficient founda-
tion to show that appellant's constitutional rights were 
explained to him or that the statements were made voluntarily 
in view of the injury to appellant's eye (T.373). The state 
offered to lay this foundation, and the appellant requested 
that it be done out of the presence of the jury (T.374,375). 
The request was granted, and Officer Riet was examined out 
of the jury's presence (T.378-384). The appellant then 
renewed his objection to the evidence, and the objection 
was overruled (T.384). The court did grant appellant's 
request that the trial be continued to the following morning. 
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Id. When trial resumed, the appellant offered two further 
objections to the evidence: first, appellant claimed 
surprise because of the prosecutions' failure to honor an 
informal agreement to provide all witnesses' statements, 
and second, appellant was denied his right against self-
incrimination because he took the stand unaware of the 
State's rebuttal evidence (T.386). The court denied the 
motion to suppress the evidence on both grounds (T.391). 
Appellant then moved the court for a hearing out of the 
jury's presence on the voluntariness of the appellant's 
statement. Id. The prosecutor stated that he had no 
objection to further questioning of Officer Riet out of 
the jury's presence (T.398). Appellant rejected this 
offer, and stated that he desired a hearing with 
additional witnesses. Id. The court held that the state-
ment was made voluntarily, and denied the request for 
further hearings (T.404). However, the appellant cross-
exarnined Officer Riet out of the jury's presence before 
his testimony was put before the jury (T.405-413). In the 
presence of the jury, the officer testified that he had asked 
appellant what had happened, and that appellant had replied, 
"Well, I had to shoot the man. They were corning at me all 
at once. And I can handle one or two at a time but I can't 
handle five at once." (T.416-417). The trial court ruled 
that this statement was not a confession (T.450). 
-5-
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The appellant proposed no instructions on the 
subject of the weight to be given the officer's testimony, 
and stated that he would not except to the court's failure 
to give one (T.450-451). During closing argument, the 
prosecutor commented on the appellant's explanation of 
his actions (T.483). The appellant did not object at 
that time, but later moved for a mistrial on the grounds 
that the statement commented on the failure of appellant's 
wife to testify (T.538). The motion was denied. Id. The 
jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser included 
offense of manslaughter, and it is from this conviction 
that this appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMITING THE 
HEARING ON THE VOLUNTARINESS OF APPELLANT'S ADMISSION TO 
OFFICER RIET'S TESTIMONY. 
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY 
DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS BECAUSE HIS STATEMENT WAS 
AN "ADMISSION" AND NOT A "CONFESSION. 
In State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 602, 
126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942), this court defined admission 
and confessions: 
-6-
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"A confession is an admission 
of guilt by the defendant of all the 
necessary elements of the crime of 
which he is charged, including the 
necessary acts and intent. An admission 
merely admits some fact which connects 
or tends to connect the defendant with 
the offense but not with all the 
elements of the crime." 
The courts of other jurisdictions have also adopted these 
"well drawn distinctions" and have cited Masato with 
approval. Fletcher v. State, 352 N.E.2d 517, 522 (Ind. 
App. 1976). Appellant's statement contained a claim of 
self-defense and did not admit all elements of the offense, 
and is therefore not a confession. At trial, the court 
held that the statement was not a confession (T.450), and 
appellant's counsel conceded it was not a confession (T.392). 
The cases cited by appellant refer only to confessions and 
are therefore not in point. As this Court noted in Masato, 
supra at 602, 126 P.2d at 1052: 
" • The great weight of 
authority and the better reasoned 
cases hold that before receiving 
an admission--as distinguished from 
a confession--in evidence, it is not 
necessary that a preliminary showing 
be made to the effect that the state-
ment was voluntary." 
This holding was followed in State v. Hymas, 102 Utah 371, 374, 
131 P.2d 791, 793 (1942). Respondent submits that the court. 
below did not err in admitting appellant's admission in evidence. 
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B. THE APPELLANT WAS ALLOWED TO PRESENT ALL 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO THE COURT BEFORE THE ADMISSION WAS 
GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
This Court thoroughly discussed the principles 
that govern the review of a trial court's determination 
that an admission was voluntary in State v. Louden, 15 
Utah 2d 64, 68-69, 387 P.2d 240, 243-244 (1963), vacated 
on other grounds, 379 u.s. 1 (1964): 
"But the procedure for determining 
voluntariness is open to some question. 
It should be born firmly in mind 
that it would be the receipt of such 
unreliable evidence, and not the varia-
tion from some suggested method for 
determining its reliability, which 
would constitute prejudicial error. 
There is no statutory mandate as to 
the procedure to be followed. Nor 
should there be any rigid and inviolable 
one. The dl.l'fi which devolves upon the 
trial court is to adopt and follow some 
procedure which will guard against the 
admission of spurious confessions or 
admissions. How this is done may vary 
somewhat depending upon the circumstances 
of each case, and the court should have 
considerable latitude of discretion as 
to how to protect the right of the defendant 
in that regard. If that purpose is served, 
the fact that the course adopted may vary 
from some other procedure which may also 
have been deemed permissible, should not 
result in the reversal of the conviction. 
It must be borne in mind that the court 
has not only the duty mentioned to the 
defendant, it must also safeguard the rights 
of the State. Furthermore, it has the 
responsibility of seeing that the trial 
moves forward in an orderly manner with 
such reasonable expedition as can be 
achieved consistent with looking after the 
interests of both sides of the controversy. 
-8-
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It would be quite impractical to 
halt the main trial, excuse the jury, 
and conduct a collateral trial on the 
question of voluntariness of an 
admission or a confession every 
time defense counsel might make an 
objection. While this has indeed 
been approved as proper procedure 
under circumstances which require it, 
it should be done only when there is 
presented such a genuine and substantial 
issue as to voluntariness that in the 
court's judgment there is some real 
possibility that permitting the jury to 
hear the evidence would so prejudice 
their minds that the defendant could 
not have a fair trial." 
In this case, the appellant requested the trial 
court to halt the trial after both sides had presented their 
case in chief, and conduct a hearing on the voluntariness 
of the admission that would include testimony by the arresting 
officer, the appellant, and all other officers involved in 
the case (T.391). Appellant's counsel expected the hearing 
to be extensive, and to involve a number of witnesses (T.392). 
Appellant was not granted the extended hearing he requested, 
but was allowed to question the arresting officer on voir 
dire and to cross-examine him (T.378-384,405-413). The 
appellant himself testified that he could not remember making 
the statement (T.442-445). There is no evidence in the record 
that anyone other than the appellant and the arresting 
officer was present when the statement was made (T.399). 
Appellant's only proffer of proof as to what he hoped to 
establish from the other officer's testimony was the fact 
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that they had also asked appellant for a statement and 
that they had never known that Officer Riet had taken a 
statement from the appellant. Id. While this testimony 
might be relevant to the issue of whether the admission 
was made at all, respondent submits that it would have 
been irrelevant to the issue of whether the admission 
was made voluntarily. Respondent submits that the court 
below gave appellant an opportunity to explore all 
relevant evidence going to the voluntariness of the 
admission and refused to exclude the admission as 
involuntary (T.373,384,303). The court's finding is 
supported by substantial evidence; the officer testified 
that appellant stated he understood his constitutional 
rights, appeared to be coherent, and refused to answer 
further questions after the statement was made (T.380). 
Respondent submits that the trial court did not err 
either in limiting the hearing to Officer Riet's testimony, 
or in finding that the admission was made voluntarily. 
The court adopted a procedure that protected defendant's 
rights, and the court's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE 
A SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION ON THE OFFICER'S CREDIBILITY AS 
A WITNESS. 
-10-
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A. THE CLAIMED ERROR WAS INVITED BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant's counsel stated that he had no 
instructions to offer on the subject of the appellant's 
admission or the officer's testiMony, that he would take 
no exception to the court's failure to give an instruction, 
and that the court's procedure in instructing the jury on 
this point was proper (T.450-451). Appellant may not take 
advantage of a claimed error that he has invited. State v. 
Olsson, No. 15040 (Utah, October 31, 1977). Appellant's 
point II on appeal is, therefore, not a grounds for reversal. 
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
ITS DUTY TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 
OFFICER'S TESTIMONY. 
The competency of an admission as evidence is a 
question for the court, but the weight to be given an 
admission is a question for the jury. State v. Crank, 105 
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943). The jury members in this 
case were instructed that they were the sole and final 
judges of all questions of fact, and that they had the duty 
to decide how much weight should be given to each witnesses' 
testimony (R.77,123). Appellant contends that these· 
instructions are inadequate, however, because the jury was 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not instructed that it had the duty to determine the weight 
of the officer's testimony regarding appellant's admission. 
In State v. Vaughn, 554 P.2d 210, 211 (Utah 1976), this 
Court held that it wasnoterror to refuse a request for 
an instruction on credibility of a particular witness 
and stated: 
"The trial court is in the 
best position to determine what 
lengths of specificity or 
emphasis he will indulge with 
each particular witness of this 
type, and anyway and after all 
the jury analyzes and inventories 
what degree of credibility it will 
attach to a witness." 
Respondent submits that Vaughn controls this case, and that 
it was not error to fail ~ sponte to give a specifc 
instruction on the credibility of the officer's testimony. 
Further, respondent submits that appellant could have 
presented any evidence he may have had that the admission 
was involuntary to the jury (T.398). Appellant can claim 
no error that evidence of the admission's voluntariness 
was not given to the jury. Respondent asserts that the 
court and jury properly performed their respective roles, 
as outlined in Crank, supra. The court found the evidence 
competent (T.384,404), and the jury was instructed to 
weigh all the evidence and determine which witnesses were 
truthful (R.77,123). The conviction should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 
ON THE GROUNDS OF SURPRISE. 
Appellant objected to the introduction of 
Officer Riet's rebuttal evidence on the ground of 
surprise, and the court overruled the objection 
(T.386,391). Respondent avers that this ruling was 
correct because the prosecution was under no duty to 
reveal the rebuttal evidence to the defense prior to 
trial. No duty to disclose existed because the evidence 
was not favorable to the defense, it was used only on 
rebuttal, and no specific request for disclosure had 
been made. 
As to the first point, respondent asserts that 
the prosecutionisonly obligated to disclose evidence that 
is favorable to the defense. Appellant has cited United 
States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1972), for 
the proposition that the prosecution must disclose all 
evidence "crucial to the question of appellant's guilt 
or innocence." (Brief of appellant, page 20). The 
quotation from Bryant, supra, is incomplete; the court 
actually said that the evidence was: 
-13-
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" • • crucial to the question 
of appellant's guilt or innocence. 
That fact, coupled with the unavoidable 
possibility that the [evidence] might 
have been significantly 'favorable' 
to the accused is enough to bring these 
cases within constitutional concern." 
Bryant at 648. (Emphasis added.) 
Although Bryant discusses constitutional rights, an examination 
of the case shows that the holding was based, at least in part, 
on Rule 16, Fed. R. Crim. P., and the Jencks Act, 18 u.s.c. § 
3500 (1970). Utah has no analogous statute or rule. Respondent 
submits that Bryant is of no aid to appellant. To the contrary, 
respondent concludes that this issue is controlled by this 
Court's discussion in State v. Dowell, 30 Utah 2d 323, 517 
P.2d 1016, appeal dismissed and cert. denied 417 U.S. 962 
(1974), where this Court explained the cases requiring 
disclosure of prosecution evidence: 
" • the court stated that it 
~new of no constitutional requirement 
that the prosecution must make a 
complete and detailed accounting to 
the defense of all poLice investigatory 
work on a case. The court explained 
that suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon a 
defense production request violated due 
process ••• The court cited the 
following factors by which the conduct 
of the prosecution was to be measured: 
••• (b) The evidence's favorable 
character to the defense •••• " 
Dowell at 326, 517 P.2d at 1018. 
Respondent submits that the prosecution was under no duty 
to disclose the evidence because it was not favorable to the 
defense. 
-14-
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Second, respondent submits that there was no 
prosecution duty to disclose because the evidence was not 
used in the State's case in chief, but only to rebut 
appellant's claim that the shooting was accidental. 
In State v. Harris, 14 Wash.App. 414, 542 P.2d 122, 126 
(1975), the Court observed that: 
"The prosecution is not required 
•. to anticipate all facets of the 
defendant's case and prepare for its 
rebuttal case in advance of trial, and 
it is under no obligation to unearth 
statements made to possible rebuttal 
witnesses and furnish them on demand." 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Respondent submits that the prosecution was not bound to 
disclose possible rebuttal evidence prior to trial. 
Thirdly, respondent contends that the informal 
agreement between the prosecution and the appellant's 
counsel was too general and vague to be enforced. The 
prosecutor understood the agreement differently than 
appellant's counsel and did not believe that he had 
violated it (T.388-389). Assuming, however, that appel-
lant's description of the agreement was accurate, it required 
the prosecution to disclose "all evidence that he intended 
to use at trial." (Brief of Appellant, page 18, T.389). 
The appellant could not have asked the trial court to order 
discovery that broad. "A defendant's motion for discovery 
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must ••• describe the requested information with at least 
some degree of specificity and must be sustained by 
plausible justification." People v. Superior Court, 70 
Cal.Rptr. 480, 484 (1968); State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357, 
517 P.2d 1315, cert. denied 418 U.S. 970, reh. denied 
419 U.S. 887 (1974). If the trial court could not have 
ordered this kind of a "fishing expedition" in the first 
instance, a fortiori it cannot indirectly enforce it by 
penalizing the prosecution for failure to provide all 
the material requested. Further, the requested material 
would have been exempt from any pre-trial discovery. 
nReports compiled by law enforcement authorities in the 
course of their investigation constitute the work product 
of the state, and, as such, are privileged from pre-trial 
discovery." State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 99 
Ariz. 382, 409 P.2d 547, 548 (1966). Even assuming that 
the report was not exempt from discovery, appellant's 
failure to make a specific request for disclosure defeats 
this claim of error. 
If the failure to make a pre-trial disclosure 
is considered error, respondent submits that the error 
is harmless. Any prejudice appellant may have suffered 
due to surprise could have been remedied by a continuance 
of the trial. The record does not contain a request for 
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a continuance, and appellant does not challenge any failure 
to grant a continuance as error. Appellant cannot legitimately 
complain of prejudice due to surprise. Further, limiting 
the prejudice that might have resulted from non-disclosure 
is the fact that Officer Riet had always been listed as a 
State's witness in this case (T.389). The substance of his 
testimony could have been discovered through reasonable dili-
gence, and a timely specific request for discovery of the 
officer's report could have, therefore, been made. Also, 
appellant's counsel was given access to the report at the 
time of trial, and he used the report effectively in cross-
examining Officer Riet (T.417-439). 
Appellant claims that if he had known about his 
prior statement contained in Officer Riet's report, he might 
have remained off of the witness stand. However, a criminal 
defendant always runs the risk that he might be contradicted 
or attacked through evidence of a prior inconsistent statement 
if he takes the stand. The rebuttal evidence in this case 
presented no unique possibilities of prejudice, and, therefore, 
did not undermine the appellant's right against self-incrimination. 
Appellant has cited no authority for his proposition that 
unexpected rebuttal evidence abridges the right against self-
incrimination, and respondent submits that no such authority' 
exists. 
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In conclusion, respondent submits that the 
prosecution was under no duty to disclose the rebuttal 
evidence prior to trial, and that appellant has 
demonstrated no undue prejudice due to the non-disclosure. 
The court below did not err in admitting the statement 
in evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL ON THE GROUNDS OF AN 
ALLEGED COMMENT ON THE FAILURE OF THE APPELLANT'S WIFE 
TO TESTIFY. 
A. MISTRIAL WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE REMEDY. 
The allegedly prejudicialremark occurred at 
page 483 of the transcript. The appellant did not, at 
that time, object to the remark, request that it be stricken, 
or ask the court for a cautionary admonition. The appellant 
later made a motion for a mistrial which was denied (T.538). 
The appellant rested on that motion and made no request 
for a cautionary admonition. Respondent avers that appel-
lant's failure to use a less drastic means of limiting the 
possible prejudice to himself defeats his claim of error. 
Mistrial is a drastic remedy that should only be 
resorted to when other, less drastic, means of limiting 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
possible prejudice are unavailable. State v. Vaughn, supra. 
If the prosecutor had commented on the failure of the 
appellant's wife to testify, a cautionary instruction would 
have been appropriate and would have cured any possible 
prejudice. State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 
(1972)~ Utah Rules of Evidence 39. " ••• it is possible 
for the trial judge to correct this error by a timely and 
adequate admonition to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's 
statements and in support of the privileges not to testify 
at trial." (Brief of Appellant, page 23.) In short, the 
alleged error could have been corrected without declaring 
a mistrial, but appellant made no attempt to do so. This 
failure defeats his claim of error. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT DID NOT COMMENT 
ON THE FAILURE OF APPELLANT'S WIFE TO TESTIFY. 
Appellant's explanation for his act of pointing 
a loaded gun at the intended victim Goodman was that he 
feared Goodman had a gun and would harm his wife, who was 
coming to the club (T.324). The appellant testified that 
he had called his wife and asked her not to come to the 
club, but that he had been unable to dissuade her (T.321). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to show that 
this testimony was inherently incredible: 
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"He warned Carol over the 
phone. Could have--he said he talked 
to her. 'Well, she's coming over.' 
What did he tell her? He could tell 
her, 'Carol, don't come. I think 
Charlie's got a gun and by God he's 
going to come in here and kill you. 
You're crazy for coming.' Well, 
we don't know what he told her. 
I suppose we'll never know what he 
said to his wife." (T.483). 
The remark was intended by the prosecutor to point out gaps 
and inconsistencies in the appellant's testimony, not to 
refer to the fact that appellant's wife did not testify. 
Appellant could have testified about what was said over 
the phone~ there was no need to call his wife to testify. 
Respondent submits that no reasonable jury could infer 
from the prosecutor's statement that appellant had kept 
his wife off the stand. The prosecutor's statement was 
not an express comment on the appellant's wife's failure 
to testify, such as was involved in State v. Trusty, supra, 
and State v. Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963). 
Respondent submits that the prosecutor's statement was not 
a comment on the appellant's exercise of an evidentiary 
privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, 
respondent submits that the judgment and sentence rendered 
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below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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